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ABSTRACT
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People’s Republic of China. It uses a data set that consists of detailed characteristics of 6407 urban
households, a continuous measure of health care spending, and price. A two-part model and a
discrete factor model are used in the estimation. Household characteristics and work conditions
impact the demand for medical care. Income elasticity is around 0.3, indicating medical care is a
necessity. Medical care demand is price inelastic, and price elasticity is larger in absolute value for
poorer households.
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The Demand for Medical Care in Urban China
I. Introduction
There has been a growing concern in the United States and elsewhere regarding the rapidly
increasing national spending on medical care and rising medical care costs (Newhouse 1992).  To
suggest policies that may help the financing of the health care delivery system without creating
burdens on low income groups, researchers have been investigating the determinants of health care
demand and spending in developed countries (e.g. Di Matteo and Di Matteo 1998, Hitiris and
Posnett 1992, Milne and Molana 1991, Kenkel 1990, Wedig 1988, Parkin, McGuire and Yule
1987, Manning et al. 1987a, Wagstaff 1986, Colle and Grossman 1978, Newhouse 1977).  The
issue is especially important for developing nations which face an increasing demand for health
services, coupled with a lack of funds to finance the health care system due to adverse
macroeconomic conditions (Abel-Smith 1986).   Consequently, a significant amount of research
has been devoted to the investigation of the determinants of the demand for medical care in
developing countries (Akin, Guilkey and Denton 1995, Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer 1994,
Gertler, Locay and Sanderson 1987, Dor, Gertler and Van der Gaag 1987, Akin et al. 1986,
Musgrove 1983).
After China started its economic reforms in the late 1970s, and especially after the State
Council approved the "Report on the Permission of Private Medical Practices" submitted by the
Ministry of Public Health in 1980, a private medical market began to emerge.  For example, in
Shanghai four private hospitals appeared in 1984; by 1989 the number rose to 15.  There were 110
private hospitals in China in 1990 (Liu, Liu and Meng, 1994).  The transition to a more market-
oriented health care system in China coincided with increased demand for medical care services,
partly due to increased disposable incomes.  It also coincided with increased medical care costs
(Henderson 1990).  China spent 3.5 percent of its GNP on health care in 1990 (World Bank
1993).  Since the inception of government and labor health insurance schemes in 1951-52,
spending on these insurance programs increased from 270 million yuan in 1952 to 22,440 million
yuan in 1989: an average 12.7 percent annual rate of increase (Liu and Hsiao 1995).     1 Hu et al. (1999) analyzed the determinants of out-of-pocket medical expenditures with a small
number of explanatory variables, which did not include price.
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Although research on the determinants of health care coverage and health services
utilization in China is reasonably extensive (Hu et al. 1999, Henderson et al. 1998, Lin and Bian
1991, Davis 1988), information on the demand for medical care is absent.
1 This is the first paper
to investigate the determinants of the demand for medical care in the People’s Republic of China.
It uses very detailed household-level data, which include a continuous measure of health care
spending as well as price.  Employing two estimation methods we report the impact of a host of
household characteristics on the demand for medical care along with price and income elasticities.
Price elasticity is an important piece of information, especially for developing countries where
health care is subsidized by the government.  For example, in developing countries fees charged
at public health facilities are typically below the marginal cost.  This is believed to create a
superficial demand for services, that can be reduced by raising the price of care (Musgrove 1986).
If a price increase does not generate significant reductions in the use of health services, then it
constitutes a legitimate option to collect revenue to (partially) finance the health care delivery
system.   
There is no consensus on the magnitude of the income elasticity of health care obtained
from cross-country data (Di Matteo and Di Matteo 1998,  Blomqvist and Carter 1997, Hitiris and
Posnett 1992, Parkin, McGuire and Yule 1987, Newhouse 1977).  This paper is one of the few
that exploits a household level data set with alternative measures of income, which enables the
estimation of the income elasticity, while addressing the issue of potential endogeneity of income.
Section II describes the theoretical model and Section III presents the empirical framework.
Section IV describes the data set, Section V contains the results, and Section VI is the conclusion.
II. The Model
Based on Grossman's seminal work (Grossman 1972a, 1972b) an individual's utility
function is assumed to depend on a consumption commodity Z(t) and sick time S(t).  More
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where U(.) is  a quasi-concave utility function, T is time of death, and "(t) is a time discount
factor.  It is assumed that Uz>0, Us<0.
Sick time depends on the level of health capital, H(t), such that 
(2) s(t)=ƒ1[H(t)],   ƒ1'<0, ƒ1''>0.
Net investment in the stock of health, depicted in Equation (3) below, is equal to gross
investment, I(t), minus depreciation.  The rate of depreciation, *, is a function of t (the age of the
individual), and environmental factors, X.  
Gross investment at time t, I(t), is produced according to a household production function,
where medical care, M(t), and time input are ingredients.  More formally,
(4) I(t)=ƒ2(M(t), time, F(t); E),
where E represents the variables that influence the productivity of health investment, such as the
stock of human capital.  A novelty of this paper is the consideration that the consumption of
nutritious foods, F(t), is another input into the production function.  Thus, consumers are assumed
to produce gross investment in health by combining their own time with purchased medical care
and food.  Asset accumulation is described by Equation (5) 
The rate of change of financial assets is a function of the stock of assets, A(t), the rate of
interest, r, earned income Y(.), and the outlays on a consumption commodity, medical care, and
food where P
z, P
m , and P
f stand for the prices of the consumption commodity, medical care, and
food, respectively.  It is assumed that YS#0, YM#0, and YF#0; i.e. being sick, consuming medical
care or food cannot increase income directly.






boundary conditions H(0)=H0, A(0)=A0, T=min{t:H(t)#H
d}, where H
d is the 'death' stock of
health, and A(T)$0.  This yields the following equilibrium condition.
where B(t) is the marginal cost of gross investment in health, B) is the percent change in gross 
investment in health, and 8 is the shadow price of initial assets.
Our data set, which consists of households in urban China, includes individuals who are
mostly employed at state work units, state enterprises, collective enterprises or similar institutions.
This institutional structure implies that days off due to sickness are not associated with a reduction
in income up to a high threshold, typically six months.  This justifies the assumption that YS=0,
which yields the following formulation of the equilibrium condition.
(6A)  lnUs-ln8+lnƒ1' =ln*+lnB(t)+lnR,   where R={r+*[t,X(t)]-B)}/*.
This formulation emphasizes the consumption benefit of health.  More precisely, it assumes
that the optimality condition involves the equality between the marginal consumption benefit of
health and the marginal cost of new investment.
From (2), we obtain that lnƒ1'=ƒ3[H(t)].  The production function of gross investment in
health depicted by (4) gives rise to a marginal cots of gross investment function, where the prices





Most previous research hypothesized that r-B=0, which implies R=1.  Alternatively, it
can be postulated that R=ƒ5(t)  (Grossman 1972a, Muurinen 1982, Wagstaff 1986).  These
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time, t, X, E).     2  For a detailed derivation of these equations see Grossman (1972a), Muurinen (1982), or
Wagstaff (1986).
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Our empirical analysis involves estimation of equation (10), using a data set that contains
information on 6407 households in urban locations of the People's Republic of China.
III. Empirical Implementation
Estimation of a demand for medical care equation requires the treatment of zero
expenditures.  Researchers have dealt with this issue by either estimating two-part models, or
selection models.  The use of the two-part model assumes that the decision to spend (the
participation equation) is independent of the decision on the level of spending.  Although the two-
part model can be criticized on the grounds of this potentially restrictive assumption (e.g. Hay and
Olsen 1984, Maddala 1985), it has been shown that estimation of a two-part model does not have
a significant impact on the results (Duan et al. 1984), and that if the true model is of the selection
type, then the two-part model provides a good estimate of the response surface (Manning, Duan
and Rogers 1987).  In addition to its robustness, another appealing feature of the two-part model
is that it allows an investigation as to whether variables of interest have larger impacts on the
participation or consumption decisions (Manning et al. 1995).  Thus, two-part models are
frequently employed benchmarks in  health economics research that involves observations with
a cluster at zero.  
 The main objection to the selection models centers around the fact that they assume a bi-
variate normal distribution between the error terms (Duan et al. 1983), and they are known to be
sensitive to departures from normality (Goldberger 1983).  In this paper we estimate a two-part
model of demand for medical care.  For comparison purposes, we also present estimates from the
discrete factor method (DFM) (Heckman and Singer 1984, Mroz 1999) which allows for selection.
However, unlike standard selection corrections, DFM estimates a semiparametric  distribution to
approximate the distribution between the error term of the selection and spending equation.  Mroz
(1999) demonstrates that when the true correlation of the error terms is normal, DFM performs6
well in comparison to estimators which assume normality; and DFM performs better than
normality-based  estimators when the underlying distribution is non-normal.  (See Blau and Hagy
(1998), Hu (1999), Blau and Mocan (1999) for applications of this discrete factor model).
The empirical framework can be summarized as follows.  The latent variable Ii is a
function of a set of explanatory variables X, and error term ,1, where i represents the households.
(11) Ii=Xi"+,1i.
A dichotomous variable Di is defined as Di=1 if Ii>0 (households  with positive health
care spending), and Di=0 otherwise.  For those households  with positive health care spending,
the log-level of spending is determined by
(12) ln(Si|Di=1)=Xi$+,2i, 
where S stands for spending on medical care (S=MP, where M is the quantity and P is the
price of medical care).  Identification of the model is discussed in the results section.
Estimation of a two-part model treats the first equation as a logit, where the probability
of the discrete event of positive medical care spending is explained as
(13)  Prob(Di=1)=exp{Xi"}/[1+exp{Xi"}], where X is a row vector of explanatory
variables.  In this framework, the expected value of the unconditional spending is
E(Si)=Prob(Di=1)E(Si|Di=1).  Taking the natural logarithm of (13) yields
(14)    ln[Prob(Di=1)]=Xi"-ln[1+exp{Xi"}].
If a particular explanatory variable x is in logs, the elasticity of Prob(Di=1) with respect
to x is equal to "[1/(1+exp{Xi"})]="[1-Prob(D=1)].  In equation (12), if x is in logs, the
elasticity of S with respect to x is $.  Thus, the unconditional elasticity is
(15)    0="[1-Prob(D=1)]+$.
If the explanatory variable x is not in logs, then using (14) it can be shown that the
elasticity of Prob(Di=1) with respect to x is "[1-Prob(D=1)]x.  Using (12) it can be seen that the
elasticity of S with respect to x is ($x).  Thus, the unconditional elasticity in this case is
(16)    0=["{1-Prob(D=1)}+$]x.
The unconditional elasticity of medical care with respect to price, on the other hand, is
calculated as 
  (17)   0="[1-Prob(D=1)]+($-1).  7
This can be seen by noting that the demand for medical care is estimated as
lnM=(+$lnP, where M is the quantity of medical care, and P stands for its price.  Adding lnP
to both sides of this equation yields lnM+lnP=(+($+1)lnP.  The left-hand-side of this equation
is ln(MP), which represents the logarithm of the spending on medical care, which is the dependent
variable to be employed in this paper.  Thus, to recover the  price elasticity of medical care from
the spending equation, -1 should be added to the coefficient of the price in spending equation (12).
Alternatively, the DFM is based on the assumption that the decisions described by
Equations (11) and (12) are done jointly, rather than sequentially.  In this case, a common
unobservable is assumed to influence the decision to spend as well as the amount of  spending.
To account for this potential correlation in the errors of the two equations, we model the error
structure as
(17) ,1=u1 +D1 <,
,2=u2  +D2 <,
where u1, u2  and < are mutually independent disturbances with mean zero, and < symbolizes the
common factor  that impacts error terms  ,1 and ,2.  D1 and D2  are factor loadings which allow
for the impact of the common factor < to vary among equations. u1, u2  and < are also independent
of the explanatory variables.  Following Mroz (1999), we assume that < is governed by a discrete
distribution
(18) Prob(<=µk)=Bk;   k=1,..., K;   Bk $0,  3k Bk =1.
µk are the points of support of the distribution, and Bk are the probability weights.  The
µk’s, Bk’s, D1  and D2 are parameters to be estimated.  K is specified a priori, and we estimate the
models for alternative values of K.  The two equations are estimated jointly with full-information
maximum likelihood.  The unconditional elasticities are provided by the estimated coefficients of
the spending equation.
IV. The Data
A cross-sectional micro-data survey of urban families in the People's Republic of China
was conducted in the spring of 1989 for the principal purpose of providing more complete
measures of welfare than had previously been available.  To this end, the survey collected detailed     3 The sample provinces are Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei,
Guangdong, Yunnan and Gansu.  Khan et al. (1992) discuss the sampling procedures in more detail.
     4 This survey was funded by the Ford Foundation, and conducted with extraordinary care
under difficult circumstances by economists at the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, led by Zhao Renwai and Li Shi.  Western economists led by Keith Griffin, then of Oxford
University, and Carl Riskin of Queens College, C.U.N.Y., assisted.  This survey and a companion
survey of rural households are available in SAS format from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research as data set 9836.
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information regarding demographic characteristics of the members of the household, their income,
earnings, food consumption and prices, as well as medical expenditures and types of health
insurance held by the members.  The survey covered 6407 urban households.  The households
were themselves part of the national panel of urban households used by the State Statistical Bureau
of China for its regular survey program.  However, this particular survey was administered to
these households by local statistical bureaus.  Administrative complexity and financial restrictions
limited the survey to 71 cities in 10 of China's 30 provincial-level administrative regions.
3  The
provinces were selected to provide a representative sample from the wide variations in
geographical conditions and economic development in China.
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Total household medical spending depends on the type of insurance used by the members
of the household.  Health care coverage in urban China is provided through the place of
employment, and as explained by Whyte and Parish (1984) and Hsiao (1995), there is significant
variation in coverage of workers and their dependents as a function of the sector of employment.
There are two main types of health insurance schemes in urban China: the Government Employee
Health Insurance System and the Labor Insurance System.  In general, those employed at state
economic enterprises have almost all their medical expenses covered by the Labor Insurance
System, and pay only a nominal registration fee to initiate treatment.  They also get half of most
medical expenses for their dependents covered.  Government employees, such as teachers,
government clerks and other workers in noneconomic units are covered by the Government
Employee Health Insurance System.  In most cases they have to pay for their own dependents.
Individuals working in collective enterprises may have similar coverage, partial coverage or no
coverage at all depending upon the history and resources of the local unit and neighborhood9
(Whyte and Parish 1984, p. 65).  
There exist substantial differences regarding the extent of coverage within insurance type
and within regions.  For example, state-run enterprises with high profits often provide
comprehensive benefits, but unprofitable enterprises may only be able to offer partial coverage
with high cost-sharing levels.  Similarly, poor enterprises often do not cover dependents at all
(Grogan 1995, p. 1079).  Differences also exist between co-payment policies across regions.  For
example, individuals with government or labor insurance have on the average 90 percent of their
outpatient fees covered in the province of Jiangsu, whereas the rate is 76 percent in the province
of Hubei (Henderson et al. 1995).
Individuals who are not covered by health insurance are required to pay for their own
health expenses.  They include self-employed, the unemployed, the migrant workers and
employees of private, foreign and in some cases jointly-owned enterprises (Yuen 1996).
Henderson et al. (1995) reports that 30 percent of the individuals living in capital cities or small
cities have no insurance.
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric analysis are reported in
Table 1.  Insurance type is controlled by four variables.  PUBFIN stands for the number of
members in the household covered by publicly financed medical care.  PARTPAY represents the
number of household members who pay part of medical costs.  ALLPAY is the number of
members who pay all medical costs, and OTHERCARE represents the number of household
members who use other forms of provision of care.  As explained by Newhouse, Phelps and
Marquis (1980), the expected medical care consumption and the choice of the type of insurance
may be jointly determined, which would bias the estimated coefficients.  In our case, however,
the type of health insurance is attached to the job.  Therefore, to the extent that workers do not
choose sectors of work based on the health insurance concerns, insurance type is an exogenous
variable in our analysis.
SPENDING is the annual household spending on medical care in 1988.  It includes total
medical outlays borne by all members, including hospitalization.  28 percent of the 6407
households report zero medical spending.  The sample average of medical spending is 51 yuans
per year per household, with a standard deviation of 256, including zero expenditures.  The     5  The medical spending corresponds to outlays in 1988.  The fee question pertains to a clinic
visit that took place during the month prior to the interview, which is typically early 1989.  Hence, we
can have households that reported zero spending in 1988, but provided fee information in the
questionnaire.
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average expenditure on medical care for the households that report positive spending is 71.5
yuans.  For this group, the spending at the bottom 25th percentile is 7.3 yuans, the median
spending is 26 yuans, and the 75th percentile is 70 yuans.
Most of the members of the zero-spending households are covered by publicly financed
health insurance.  For example, in 91 percent of these households there is at least one individual
who is covered by publicly financed medical care.  Seventy-five percent of these households
involve at least two individuals who are covered by such insurance.  Seventy-eight  percent of
them report that they have no member who pays all medical costs, and 51 percent declare the
absence of members who pay part of  the medical costs.  The individuals who pay all their own
medical expenses are asked about the basic fee they paid for a visit to a local clinic during the last
month.  Only nine percent of the households with zero spending on medical care answered that
question, whereas 53 percent of the relevant households with positive spending provided an
answer.
5
It is well known that the existence of deductibles and coinsurance may generate
endogeneity of the price of medical care, which may in turn bias the estimated price elasticity.
Studies on the demand for health services have struggled to find an exogenous price measure that
is not correlated with usage.  It has been observed that it is difficult to find a truly exogenous price
measure, unless the consumers are randomly assigned to various insurance categories, as was the
case in the Rand Health Insurance Study in the United States.   As argued above, the institutional
structure of the Chinese health care delivery system suggests the exogeneity of insurance.  In this
case, the price of medical care net of insurance can be approximated by the average coinsurance
rate.  Because we implicitly control for the variation in coinsurance by including into the model
the four insurance classifications described above, the price of medical care is measured by the
unit price in the private market.  In the survey that created our data set, household members who
pay all their medical costs are asked about the basic fee they paid for their last visit to the local
clinic.  The average value of the responses to this question is used as the unit price of medical     6  The data set contains 980 households that paid all their medical expenses and reported a
nonzero price for a clinic visit.  With respect to other households, these households, on the average,
have half less members that are covered by publicly financed medical care (1.5 vs. 2.0), and more than
twice as many members who pay all their medical expenses (1.3 vs. 0.6).  Their annual medical
expenditures are more than twice as high (115 yuan vs. 52 yuan), their labor incomes are lower (326
yuan vs. 350 yuan).
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care, called MEDPRICE.  For the households where no response was recorded, the average price
of the province is assigned.
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For each household, the data set contains information on the monthly average consumption
of various food items and their prices.  Furthermore, types of food are classified into two
categories depending upon whether they are purchased with coupons in state-owned stores, or
purchased at the free market.   For purchases in state-owned stores, the average price paid in 1988
(in yuan) and the average monthly consumption (in jin) of wheat, rice, and other staple food,
edible oil, pork, beef and mutton, poultry, fish and seafood, sugar and vegetables are recorded.
The quantities and prices of the same items were recorded for purchases at the free market, with
the exception that wheat is replaced by flour.  Using these prices and quantities purchased, a food
price index is created (FOODPRICE), as follows. Pi = k1P1i+k2P2i+… +kmPmi ,   where    Pi stands
for the food price for the ith household, Pmi is the price of the mth food item for the ith household,
kj  is the sample share of the jth food (j=1,...m).  Thus, kj is total spending on the jth food by all
households, divided by total food spending of all households).
To measure the opportunity cost of time for the household we included the following
variables.  WORKING stands for the number of working members of the household.  These are
the individuals who either declared that they were working, or reported positive labor income.
STUDENT represents the number of students in the household, SPOUSE stands for the number
of spouses.  IRONRICE  stands for the number of members who work at state-owned or publicly
owned enterprises. OWNER is the number of household members who own private or individual
enterprise, or own and manage such enterprise.  TECHNICAL stands for the number of people
in the household who are professional or technical workers.  GOVERNMENT is the count of
members who are responsible officials of government offices or institutions. FTRYDIRECTOR
represents the number of household members who are factory directors or factory managers.12
OFFICEWORKER is the number of household members who are office workers, and LABORER
is the number of household members who are laborers.  These variables represent the occupation
of the members of the household, thus they may proxy market efficiency and therefore the cost
of time.  They may also represent environmental factors that are represented by the vector X in
the gross investment equation (3).  Controlling for the occupational affiliation we hope to capture
the differing rate of depreciation across the households.  Similarly, WORKBATH is a variable that
tries to gauge the characteristics of the work environment.  It is the number of household members
who bathe in the work unit's bathhouse.  WORKEAT represents the number of household
members who eat at their work unit's dining hall.  CITY is a dichotomous variable to represent
whether the residence is in a city.  This variable may capture the ease of access to medical
services. Table 1 demonstrates that 50 percent of the households are in a city.
Nonmarket efficiency is measured by the level of the human capital, which can be
approximated by the level of schooling.  Each working member of the household is assigned to
one of the following eight categories.  Less than three years of primary school, three years of
more of primary school, primary school graduate, lower middle school graduate, upper middle
school graduate, professional school graduate, community college (dazhuan) graduate, college
(daxue) graduate or above.  Using the reported level of education for each household member who
is 25 years of age and older, the average years of schooling for the household (EDUCATION) is
calculated.  The mean value of education is 10 years.
The number of household members who are national minorities (MINORITY), and the
number of Communist Party members in the household (COMMUNIST) are variables that may
capture the variation in the access to medical care because of the minority status or communist
party membership privileges.
Biological differences, differences in attitudes toward risky and unhealthy behavior, as well
as the differences in lifestyles and the efficiency in health production may differ between genders.
This suggests inclusion of gender as an explanatory variable into the demand function (Hunt-
Mccool, Kiker and Ng 1995, Wilensky and Cafferata 1983, Sindelar 1982, Grossman 1972b).
Age captures the depreciation in health capital.  Consequently, as presented in Table 1, the
number of males and females in the household are categorized into various age intervals.  For13
example,  FEMALE6-10 stands for the number of females in the household who are between ages
6 and 10; and MALE60+ represents the number of males who are 60 years of age and older.
Other variables that may capture the variation in the rate of depreciation of health capital are:
DISABLED, which represents the number of disabled individuals in the household, and
RETIRED, which stands for the number of retired people in the household.
Total household labor income, TOTINCOME, is calculated by the sum of regular wage
and floating wage income, contract income, all kinds of bonuses, above-quota wages, the sum of
housing subsidy, subsidy for non-staple food, heating, water and electricity subsidy, book and
paper allowance, bath and haircut subsidy, transportation subsidy, single-child subsidy, one-time
only subsidies (bonuses for birth control, creation and invention, etc.), hardship allowances,
income from second job, total market value of all coupons (for movies, haircuts, color TV,
refrigerator, etc.), retirement pension, supplementary income, other income received by retired
members, total income of non-working members, total income in kind received by all household
members, total gross income received by the member of the household who is an owner of private
or individual enterprise minus total operating cost of the enterprise (including expenditures on
wages, raw materials, interest, etc.), minus total taxes paid, minus various fees paid to
government departments.  VARINCOME stands for variable income, and is a component of
TOTINCOME.  It is the sum of all kinds of bonuses, above-quota wages, and other wages and
income that are not part of regular wage and income.  NLABORINC stands for non-labor income.
It is the sum of interests on savings accounts, dividends, bond interest, income from house rent,
income from leasing out other goods, machinery or tools, other non-labor income, alimony
income, transfer income, the value of gifts, boarding fees from relatives and friends, and the value
of food coupons received by all household members.  
A number of variables that describe housing conditions are included in the analysis.  Some
of these variables are related to the wealth of the household, and thus aim to capture the impact
of wealth on the demand for medical care.  Some other housing characteristics may impact the
demand for medical care through their influence on the depreciation of health capital.  The
following housing variables can be though of as related to household wealth.  ROOMS stands for
per capita number of rooms used by the household.  SHRKITCHEN is a dummy variable, which14
takes the value of 1 if the household shares a kitchen, and zero otherwise.  OWNKITCHEN is a
dummy variable, which is 1 if the household owns a kitchen, and zero otherwise.  Both of these
last two variables being zero indicates that the household does not have a kitchen.  Similarly three
dichotomous variables capture the variation in the configuration of the toilet and bath for the
household.  BATH1 is a dummy variable which is 1 if the household shares toilet and bath, and
zero otherwise.  BATH2 is a dummy variable which is 1 if the household has toilet but lacks bath.
BATH3 is a dummy variable to indicate the presence of both toilet and bath.  The left-out category
is the case where the household lacks sanitary facilities.   HEAT1 takes the value of 1 if the
household has central heating and zero otherwise.   HEAT2 is another dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if the household has other means of heating and zero otherwise. 
The housing characteristic that may impact the demand for health care through its impact
on health status is WATER, which  is a dichotomous variable that indicates the presence of own
tap water.  Other housing characteristics are represented by four dummy variables that control for
the main source of energy used for heating and cooking.  They are COAL, BOTTLEDGAS,
PIPEDGAS and KEROSENE.  
V. Results
Since both equations are reduced forms, there is no completely satisfactory way to identify
the system.  The issue is less troublesome in case of the discrete factor model, because
identification can be achieved due to non-linearity (Akin and Rous 1997).  However, for both
estimation methods, in the benchmark cases  we excluded ROOMS from the participation
equation, and CITY from the spending equation.  This assumes that the location of the household,
which may proxy access to health care, may determine whether or not to buy medical care, and
the number rooms per capita impacts the amount of spending if it proxies a wealth effect.  The
results, however, were extremely robust to any alternative identification restriction.  
If  K=1 in Equation (18), the discrete factor model reduces to a two-part model.
Likelihood ratio tests rejected the hypothesis of one point of support in favor of two points.
Following Mroz (1999) we increased the number of supports and performed likelihood ratio tests
to determine the number of supports that maximizes the likelihood function.   The results are15
based on five points of support (K=5 in Equation 18); however, there was no discernible
difference in estimated parameters for three, four, and five points of support.   The bottom of
Table 2B displays the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics of the common factor in both
equations.  Although the estimated D1 is not different from zero, D2 is highly significant.
Furthermore, we tested and rejected the hypothesis that D1=D2=0.  The bottom of Table 2B also
reports the estimated mass points and the associated probabilities.  As can be seen, most of the
mass of the distribution is given to two points, indicating a bimodal distribution.  This suggests
that estimation frameworks based on selection models using normality may not be appropriate.
To test the normality assumption, we imposed the following mass points with the associated
probabilities that approximate a normal distribution: 0.00 with probability 0.06 , 0.37 with
probability 0.24 , 0.50 with probability 0.40, 0.63 with probability 0.24, and 1.0 with probability
0.06.  The estimated model yielded a likelihood value of  -11,230.61, which generates a
likelihood ratio test with a value of 927.4 with 10 degrees of freedom, strongly rejecting the
hypothesis of normality.
The coefficients obtained from the spending equation of the discrete factor model are
unconditional elasticities, while the calculation of the elasticities based on the two-part model is
explained in Section III.
Household Characteristics
Table 2A presents the estimated two-part model.  Column I displays the estimated
coefficients of the logit model, and Column II presents their z-values.  The estimates of the
spending  equation coefficients and their t-ratios are presented in Columns III and IV,
respectively.  For both equations robust standard errors are calculated.  Table 2B presents the
estimated coefficients of the spending equation from the discrete factor model.  The unconditional
elasticities obtained from both models are displayed in Table 3.  We report elasticities if the
variable is significant in the discrete factor model, and if it is significant in at least one equation
of the two-part model.  The elasticities are evaluated at the mean values of the variables and using
the mean predicted probability of participation, which is 0.72.  The exceptions to this algorithm
are noted below.  The elasticity of medical care with respect to the number of members who pay     7 Along the same lines, if the median of a variable is zero due to skewness, we evaluated the
elasticity obtained from the two-part model at the value of 1.
     8  It should be cautioned that there are only seven disabled individuals in the whole sample.
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part of the medical costs (PARTPAY) is 0.40 in the two-part model, and 0.47 in the discrete
factor model (columns I and III of Table 3)  The range of the elasticities obtained from both
models are 0.43 to 0.58 for the number of members who pay all of the medical costs (ALLPAY),
and 0.15 to 0.39 for number of members using other forms of provision of health care
(OTHERCARE).
 The regressions control for the household size as the sum of PUBFIN, PARTPAY,
ALLPAY and OTHERCARE is equal to the size of the household.  Thus, some variables need
to be dropped to avoid perfect multicollinearity.  For example, because the sum of all age
categories also adds up to the size of the household, we dropped the category MALE25-60, which
is the number of males ages 25 to 60 in the household. Therefore, the coefficients of gender-age
categories represent the relative spending associated with an increase in each interval in
comparison to the number of males aged 25 to 60 (the left-out category).   For example, the
elasticity pertaining to FEMALE0-1 obtained from the discrete factor model is 0.63.  This
indicates that keeping all else constant, if a female child aged 0 to 1 replaces a male aged 25-60,
this generates a 63 percent increase in medical care demand.  Note that the distribution of this
variable is highly skewed.  Therefore the elasticity obtained from the two-part model of this
variable is evaluated at the value of one.
7
The  number of disabled people, the number minorities, number of communist party
members, and average years of schooling have no impact on medical care demand.
8   The presence
of a spouse has a negative impact on the demand for medical care of the household in the DFM..
The average education of the adult household members is not significant.  On the other hand, the
demand for medical care goes down as students replace members of the household who are
housekeepers (not retired, not working, not student).  In particular, if a housekeeper is replaced
by a student, the demand for medical care goes down by 19 to 24 percent (see columns I and III
of Table 3).17
Occupational affiliation is a significant determinant of the demand for medical care.  Three
occupation categories (FTRYDIRECTOR, OFFICEWORKER and LABORER) have negative
elasticities.  This indicates that households with members in these occupations spend less on
medical care than the ones with members who do not specify an occupation, which may be due
to market efficiency and higher opportunity cost of time.  The estimated coefficients of
IRONRICE demonstrate that workers who are affiliated with state-owned or publicly owned
enterprises, demand 8 to 19 percent more medical care than other types of workers.  The incomes
of these workers may be considered as permanent income in comparison to other workers, because
they have tenured employment.  Thus, the increased demand for medical care because of the
affiliation with state-owned enterprises may be due to this permanent income effect. 
An additional household member who uses the work unit's bathhouse reduces annual
household medical demand by 15 to 18  percent.  Similarly, if the household has its own tap
water, this reduced the demand for medical care by 13 percent.   These results can be attributed
to the impact of sanitation.   An additional household member who eats at the work unit's dining
hall increases the demand by 6 to 7 percent, which may be due to the additional income that is
being created by the provision of meals at the workplace.  
As for the housing conditions, both the households that have their own toilet and bath, and
households that share sanitary facilities  have higher demand for medical care in comparison to
households with no bath or toilet.   If the household has central heating, the demand for medical
care is higher in comparison to households with no heating.  Similarly, per capita rooms has an
elasticity of 0.13 to 0.17. To the extent that these variables reflect some aspects of wealth, they
imply that wealthy households spend more on medical care. 
If the main source of heating and cooking is coal, bottled gas or piped gas, the demand for
medical care is lower.  The elasticity of medical care with respect to food price is between -0.05
and -0.15, which suggests that food and medical care are gross complements (columns II and IV
of Table 3).18
Price and Income Effects
Most previous work reported insensitivity of medical spending to changes in price for the
United States (Wedig 1988, Manning et al.1987a, Feldstein 1977, Newhouse and Phelps 1976,
Phelps and Newhouse 1974).  The evidence is less clear-cut in developing countries.  While the
majority of research reported inelastic demand (e.g. Sauerborn, Nougtara and Latimer 1994,
Gertler, Locay and Sanderson 1987, Akin, Griffin, Guilkey and Papkin 1986,  Heller 1982), there
are some studies that found elastic demand for medical services (De Bethune, Alfani and Lahaye
1989, Yoder 1989, Chernichovsky and Meesook 1986).   The bottom of Table 3 presents the price
and income elasticities.  The estimated price elasticity is -0.87 in the two-part model, and -0.66
in the discrete factor model.  This suggests that an increase in price would generate an increase
in revenues obtained from medical care services.
Most studies which used cross-country data estimated income elasticities that are greater
than one (Newhouse 1977, Parkin et al. 1987, Gerdtham et al.1992), which suggests that health
care is a luxury good.  On the other hand, pooled country cross sections provide income elasticity
estimates that are less than or near one ( Di Matteo and Di Matteo 1998, Hitiris and Posnett
1992).  Thus, no consensus emerged from aggregate data, and the debate on whether or not health
care is a luxury good continues (Blomqvist and Carter 1997). Table 3 demonstrates that the
estimated income elasticity is 0.82 in the two-part model, and 0.65 in the discrete factor model.
Newhouse (1992) points out the possibility that within-country income elasticities may be distorted
by the endogeneity of income at the household level.  This is because sickness simultaneously
depresses income and increases medical spending.  To entertain the possibility that household
income is endogenous, we instrumented household income with non-labor income
(NONLABORINC) and variable income (VARINC).  Non-labor income is the sum of interests
on savings accounts, bonds and dividends, income from house rent and from leasing out other
goods, machinery or tools, as well as other non-labor income, alimony income, transfer income,
the value of gifts, boarding fees from relatives and friends, and the value of food coupons received
by all household members.   VARINC is the sum of all kinds of bonuses, above-quota wages, and
other wages and income that are not part of regular wage and income.   Sickness of the household
members is not likely to significantly impact these items.  In the first stage, these variables were19
significant determinants of total income.  The income elasticities obtained from this procedure
were 0.80 and 0.58, respectively, from the two-part and discrete factor models.  This suggests that
medical care is a necessity in urban China, which is consistent with estimates obtained from other
within-country data sets.  
Province Effects
To investigate the sensitivity of the results to geographic variation, we included nine
dummy variables for the 10 provinces and re-estimated the models.  The results are reported in
Tables 4A and 4B, and the calculated elasticities are presented in columns II and IV of Table 3
for the two-part model, and DFM, respectively.  The inclusion of province dummies reduced the
magnitude of the elasticities in all cases, expect for the medical care price elasticity.  The
estimated variances of certain household characteristics increased.  For example, in the two-part
model, variables such as RETIRED, WORKBATH and HEAT1 are not significant when the
province dummies are included; and as a result, column II of Table 3 does not report elasticities
for these variables.  For the DFM, inclusion of the province dummies eliminated statistical
significance of a larger set of variables.  For example, the entire set of variables capturing
household living and sanitary conditions, (HEAT1, WATER, BATH1, BATH2, BATH3, COAL,
BOTTLEDGAS, PIPEDGAS) lost their significance.  
The income elasticity estimate became smaller in response to the inclusion of province
dummies: it is 0.32 in the two-part model, and 0.28 in the DFM, suggesting strongly that medical
care is a necessity in urban China.
Inclusion of province dummies increased the price elasticity of medical care in absolute
value.  In the case of the two-part model, the estimated elasticity is -1.03.  However, its 95
percent confidence interval is -0.95 to -1.11; thus we cannot reject the hypothesis of inelastic
demand for medical care.  On the other hand, the price elasticity estimated from the DFM is -
0.81, with a 95 percent confidence interval of -0.74 to -0.88.  Given these results, we conclude
that the demand for medical care is price inelastic. 
Even though the insensitivity of medical care usage to changes in its price seems like the
norm with few exceptions, price elasticity may be different for different groups in the population.
In particular, the poor may be more sensitive to changes in price than the rich.  In this case, a20
non-discriminating increase in user fees may have a detrimental impact on health care utilization
of the poor.  There are only a few studies that investigated the difference in price responsiveness
of different income groups.  Akin, Guilkey and Denton (1995) found no difference in price
elasticity between poor and non-poor in Nigeria, while Gertler, Locay and Sanderson (1987)
report that price elasticity is larger for the very poor in Peru, and Sauerborn, Nougtara and
Latimer (1994) find that the services used by infants and children, and lowest income quartile are
price elastic in Burkina Faso.
To calculate the price elasticity for different income groups, we re-estimated the models
with an interaction term of the price of medical care and income.  We evaluated the resultant price
elasticity at the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles of the income distribution.  In the model with no
province dummies the price elasticity of medical care was -0.97 for the 10
th percentile, -0.86 for
the median income household, and it was -0.80 for the 90
th percentile of the income distribution
using the two-part model.   Discrete factor model provided the same pattern with lower price
elasticities.  Price elasticity was -0.74 for the 10
th percentile, -0.66 for median income, and -0.55
for the 90
th percentile.   In the models which included province dummies price elasticities were
-1.06 for the 10
th percentile, -1.03 for the median income household, an -0.98 for the 90
th
percentile in the two-part model; they were -0.84 for the 10
th percentile, -0.81 for the median
income household, an -0.77 for the 90
th percentile in the DFM. This indicates that poor
households are more sensitive to changes in price.  Thus, although an increase in the price of
medical care would be associated with increased revenues, it would reduce the demand for medical
care more for poor households than it would for rich households.  
VI.  Conclusion
Using a data set that consists of detailed characteristics of 6407 urban households of 10
provinces of the People's Republic of China, this paper investigates the determinants of the
demand for medical care.  Descriptive statistics reveal that 28 percent of the households report
zero spending on medical care.  Most members of these households are covered by publicly
financed health insurance.  The average expenditure on medical care for the households that report21
positive spending is 71.5 yuans; it is 51 yuans per household per year for all households.  Thus,
the share of medical care spending is 10 percent of total household income from all sources.
We fit both a two-part model, and a discrete factor model to the data, which provide
consistent results.  The discrete factor models allows for selection, but estimates a semi-parametric
distribution for the error terms between the participation and spending equations. Household
characteristics have significant impact on medical care demand.   For example, the estimated
coefficients for gender-age intervals show that replacing one adult male with a female infant (age
0 to 1) increases the household’s demand for medical care, and that replacing one adult male with
a female aged 19 to 24 decreases it.  The presence of a student in the household has a negative
impact on the demand for medical care.  Occupation and type of insurance are also significant
determinants of the demand for medical care. 
Some of the results suggest that sanitary conditions have an impact on the demand for
medical care.  For example, households in which individuals bathe at the work unit's bathhouse
demand less  medical care.  Similarly, the demand for medical care is lower for the households
that have their own tap water.
Households with own toilet and bath, and households that share sanitary facilities  have
higher demand for medical care in comparison to households with no bath or toilet.  If the
household has central heating, the demand for medical care is higher in comparison to households
with no heating.  The elasticity of medical care with respect to per capita rooms in the household
is also positive.  These results suggest a positive wealth effect on the demand for medical care.
Inclusion of province dummies eliminates the significance of most household characteristics in the
discrete factor model.
 The estimated income elasticity is in the range of 0.65 to 0.82 with no province dummies,
and 0.28 to 0.32 in the models which include province dummies. Treating income as an
endogenous variable does not impact these results.  These estimates suggest that medical care is
a necessity in urban China. The demand for medical care is price inelastic.  Price elasticity gets
larger in absolute for poorer households.  This result suggests that although total revenue from the
provision of health care can be increased by raising the price of care, poor households would
reduce their demand more than rich households.22
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Standard
deviation
SPENDING (yuan/year) Total cost of medical care borne by all members of the
household.
51.457 256.23
MEDPRICE (yuan/visit) Price of medical care.  It is the average basic fee paid for a
visit during the last month prior to the interview by household
members who paid all medical expenses.  If no such member
is present, province average fees are substituted.
17.923 22.52
PUBFIN Number of household members covered by publicly financed
medical care.
2.002  1.13 
PARTPAY Number of household members who pay part of medical
costs.
0.716  0.89 
ALLPAY Number of household members who pay all medical costs. 0.553  0.91 
OTHERCARE Number of household members using other forms of
provision of medical care.
0.295  0.74 
FOODPRICE (yuan/jin) Weighted average of the unit prices (per jin) of wheat, rice,
flour and other staple food, and edible oil, pork, beef and
mutton, poultry, fish and seafood, sugar and vegetables;
weighted by the share in food total expenditures.
0.621 0.30
WORKING Number of household members who reported labor income or
who indicated that they were working.
2.309  0.70
STUDENT Number of household members who are students. 0.876  0.83
SPOUSE Number of spouses in the household. 0.934  0.25
IRONRICE Number of household members who work at state-owned or
publicy owned enterprises.
1.701  0.86
OWNER Number of household members who own private or individual
enterprise, or own and manage such enterprise.
0.021  0.17
TECHNICAL Number of household members who are professional or
technical workers.
0.370  0.67
GOVERNMENT Number of household members who are responsible officials
of government office or institutions.
0.102  0.33
FTRYDIRECTOR Number of household members who are factory directors or
factory managers.
0.039 0.20
OFFICEWORKER Number of household members who are office workers 0.518  0.71
LABORER Number of household members who are laborers. 1.117  0.9923
(Table 1 continued)
WORKBATH The number household members who take baths in work
unit's bathhouse.
0.862  1.05
WORKEAT The number of  household members who eat in work unit's
dining hall.
0.574  0.88
CITY Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household is located within
a city, (=0) otherwise.
0.499  0.50
EDUCATION Average years of schooling of the household members who
are 25 years of age and older.
10.261 2.63
MINORITY Number of household members who are national minority. 0.088  0.44
COMMUNIST Number of household members who are communist party
members.
0.559  0.68
FEMALE0-1 Number of females in the household who are between ages 0
and 1.
0.013  0.11
FEMALE2-5 Number of females in the household who are between ages 2
and 5.
0.081  0.28
FEMALE6-10 Number of females in the household who are between ages 6
and 10.
0.156  0.38
FEMALE11-18 Number of females in the household who are between ages 11
and 18.
0.293  0.55
FEMALE19-24 Number of females in the household who are between ages 19
and 24.
0.141  0.39
FEMALE25-60 Number of females in the household who are between ages 25
and 60.
1.019  0.28
FEMALE60+ Number of females in the household who are older than 60 . 0.095  0.30
MALE0-1 Number of males in the household who are between ages 0
and 1.
0.015  0.12
MALE2-5 Number of males in the household who are between ages 2
and 5.
0.081  0.28
MALE6-10 Number of males in the household who are between ages 6
and 10.
0.164  0.38
MALE11-18 Number of males in the household who are between ages 11
and 18.
0.306  0.55
MALE19-24 Number of males in the household who are between ages 19
and 24.
0.141  0.40
MALE60+ Number of males in the household who are older than 60. 0.060  0.2424
(Table 1 concluded)
DISABLED Number of household members who are disabled. 0.001  0.04
RETIRED Number of retirees in the household . 0.155  0.45
TOTINCOME
(yuan/year)
Total household labor income (see the text for the definition). 349.793 163.39
VARINCOME
(yuan/year)
The sum of all kinds of bonuses, above-quota wages, and





Unearned (non-labor) income (see the text for definition). 74.501 57.37
ROOMS Total number of rooms by household per capita. 0.730  0.39
SHRKITCHEN Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household shares kitchen,
(=0) otherwise.
0.058  0.23
OWNKITCHEN Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has its own
kitchen, (=0) otherwise.
0.826  0.38
BATH1 Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household shares sanitary
facilities, (=0) otherwise.
0.170  0.38
BATH2 Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has toilet, but no
bath, (=0) otherwise.
0.395  0.49
BATH3 Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has both toilet
and bath, (=0) otherwise.
0.092  0.29
HEAT1 Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has central
heating, (=0) otherwise.
0.167  0.37
HEAT2 Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has other means
of heating, (=0) otherwise.
0.237  0.43
WATER Dichotomous variable (=1) if the household has its own tap
water, (=0) otherwise.
0.813  0.39
COAL Dichotomous variable (=1) if coal is the main source of
heating and cooking, (=0) otherwise.
0.511  0.50
BOTTLEDGAS Dichotomous variable (=1) if bottled gas is the main source
of heating and cooking, (=0) otherwise.
0.278  0.45
PIPEDGAS Dichotomous variable (=1) if piped gas is the main source of
heating and cooking, (=0) otherwise.
0.172  0.38
KEROSENE Dichotomous variable (=1) if piped gas is the main source of




I II III IV
Variable Coefficient z-stat Coefficient t-stat
CONSTANT -0.483 -0.69 -1.562*** -3.28
PUBFIN -0.254** -1.96 0.093 0.96
PARTPAY 0.027 0.21 0.551*** 5.66
ALLPAY 0.343*** 2.60 0.679*** 7.11
OTHERCARE 0.141 1.04 0.454*** 4.51
MALE0-1 0.971*** 3.32 0.244 1.16
MALE2-5 1.022*** 5.43 0.127 0.96
MALE6-10 0.362** 2.28 0.080 0.68
MALE11-18 0.071 0.51 0.008 0.07
MALE19-24 -0.059 -0.45 -0.104 -1.04
MALE60+ 0.087 0.49 -0.151 -1.15
FEMALE0-1 1.006*** 3.14 0.654*** 3.04
FEMALE2-5 0.413** 2.33 0.067 0.50
FEMALE6-10 0.156 0.98 0.058 0.50
FEMALE11-18 -0.006 -0.04 -0.031 -0.30
FEMALE19-24 -0.007 -0.05 -0.207** -2.02
FEMALE25-60 -0.111 -0.70 -0.005 -0.04
FEMALE60+ 0.149 0.89 -0.048 -0.40
SPOUSE -0.060 -0.43 -0.161 -1.48
EDUCATION 0.016 1.01 -0.002 -0.21
RETIRED 0.030 0.24 -0.183** -2.07
STUDENT 0.292*** 3.32 -0.300*** -4.78
COMMUNIST 0.029 0.55 0.013 0.32
MINORITY 0.005 0.06 0.030 0.54
DISABLED 0.414 0.68 0.401 0.73
WORKING 0.296*** 2.70 -0.050 -0.70
OWNER -0.306 -1.16 -0.296* -1.90
TECHNICAL -0.416*** -3.01 -0.154 -1.60
GOVERNMENT -0.459*** -2.83 -0.069 -0.58
FTRYDIRECTOR -0.558*** -2.63 -0.360** -2.39
OFFICEWORKER -0.395** -2.97 -0.189** -2.07
LABORER -0.319** -2.49 -0.227*** -2.62
IRONRICE 0.148*** 3.13 0.064* 1.81
WORKEAT 0.093** 2.46 0.096*** 3.37
WORKBATH 0.016 0.47 -0.178*** -6.81
HEAT1 -0.880*** -9.00 0.315*** 3.7026
(Table 2A concluded)
HEAT2 -0.553*** -6.45 0.0720 1.07
WATER -0.072 -0.76 -0.145** -2.04
BATH1 -0.224** -2.39 0.289*** 3.99
BATH2 -0.107 -1.19 0.076 1.20
BATH3 0.677*** 4.50 0.297*** 3.27
CITY 0.140** 2.25 -- --
ROOMS -- -- 0.186*** 2.83
SHRKITCHEN 0.192 1.26 -0.224* -1.76
OWNKITCHEN 0.458*** 4.46 0.082 1.01
COAL 0.296 1.39 -0.604*** -4.96
BOTTLEDGAS -0.205 -0.95 -0.665*** -5.11
PIPEDGAS -0.210 -0.93 -0.605*** -4.27
KEROSENE -0.268 -0.36 -0.304 -0.54
MEDPRICE -0.763*** -12.62 0.341*** 10.32
FOODPRICE 0.401*** 4.20 -0.166** -2.34




* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 

















FEMALE 2-5 0.050 0.39
FEMALE 6-10 -0.005 -0.05
FEMALE 11-18 -0.062 -0.61
FEMALE 19-24 -0.185* -1.85
FEMALE 25-60 0.002 0.02












































* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.29
Table 3
Estimated Elasticities
I II III IV
Variable Elasticity  Elasticity  Elasticity Elasticity
(Two-part Model) (Two-part Model) (DFM) (DFM)
Province Dummies No Yes No Yes
PUBFIN 0.04 0.09 -- --
PARTPAY 0.40 -- 0.47 0.40
ALLPAY 0.43 -- 0.58 0.50
OTHERCARE 0.15 -- 0.39 0.35
MALE0-1* 0.52 0.35 0.34 --
MALE2-5* 0.41 0.41 -- --
MALE6-10* 0.18 0.15 -- --
FEMALE0-1* 0.93 0.85 0.63 0.63
FEMALE2-5* 0.18 0.17 -- --
FEMALE19-24* -0.21 -0.19 -0.18 -0.19
SPOUSE -- -- -0.20 --
RETIRED* -0.17 -- -- --
STUDENT -0.19 -0.13 -0.24 -0.18
WORKING  0.08 0.10 -- --
OWNER* -0.38 -- -- --
TECHNICAL -0.10 -0.03 -- --
GOVERNMENT* -0.20 -0.04 -- --
FTRYDIRECTOR* -0.52 -0.12 -0.33 -0.27
OFFICEWORKER -0.16 -0.07 -0.19 --
LABORER -0.35 -0.18 -0.20 --
IRONRICE 0.19 0.04 0.08 --
WORKEAT 0.07 0.06 0.06 --
WORKBATH -0.15 -- -0.18 -0.05
HEAT1* 0.07 -- 0.27 --
HEAT2 0.04 0.03 -- --
WATER -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 --
BATH1* 0.22 -- 0.23 --
BATH3* 0.49 0.11 0.30 --
CITY 0.04 0.03 -- --
ROOMS 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.17
SHRKITCHEN* -0.17 -0.13 -- --
OWNKITCHEN* 0.21 0.17 -- --
COAL -0.27 -- -0.48 --
BOTTLEDGAS* -0.72 -- -0.59 --
PIPEDGAS* -0.67 -- -0.56 --30
(Table 3 concluded)
MEDPRICE -0.87 -1.03 -0.66 -0.81
FOODPRICE -0.05 -0.26 -0.15 -0.18
TOTINCOME 0.82 0.32 0.65 0.28
* signifies variables that have highly skewed distributions and that have zero median values.  For




I II III IV
Variable Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat
CONSTANT -0.582 -0.71 1.245** 2.54
PUBFIN -0.253* -1.82 0.116 1.13
PARTPAY 0.151 1.09 0.409 4.04
ALLPAY 0.310 2.22 0.536 5.43
OTHERCARE 0.200 1.37 0.354 3.40
MALE0-1 0.899*** 2.84 0.130 0.61
MALE 2-5 0.952*** 4.77 0.142 1.09
MALE 6-10 0.339** 2.03 0.059 0.50
MALE 11-18 0.055 0.37 -0.015 -0.14
MALE 19-24 -0.073 -0.51 -0.099 -0.99
MALE 60+ 0.018 0.10 -0.071 -0.52
FEMALE0-1 0.887** 2.44 0.603*** 2.99
FEMALE 2-5 0.367* 1.90 0.072 0.55
FEMALE 6-10 0.243 1.44 -0.003 -0.03
FEMALE 11-18 -0.052 -0.35 -0.049 -0.47
FEMALE 19-24 0.006 0.04 -0.195* -1.89
FEMALE 25-60 -0.100 -0.59 -0.022 -0.18
FEMALE 60+ 0.119 0.68 0.051 0.44
SPOUSE 0.045 0.29 0.058 0.53
EDUCATION 0.008 0.48 0.012 1.09
RETIRED -0.014 -0.11 -0.041 -0.42
STUDENT 0.236*** 2.58 -0.211*** -3.30
COMMUNIST 0.069 1.25 0.005 0.14
MINORITY 0.084 1.06 -0.039 -0.64
DISABLED 0.143 0.23 0.221 0.63
WORKING 0.299*** 2.59 -0.041 -0.58
OWNER -0.238 -0.92 -0.191 -1.23
TECHNICAL -0.381*** -2.61 0.021 0.19
GOVERNMENT -0.315* -1.85 0.047 0.37
FTRYDIRECTOR -0.490** -2.24 -0.256 -1.61
OFFICEWORKER -0.378*** -2.67 -0.033 -0.32
LABORER -0.290** -2.13 -0.081 -0.81
IRONRICE 0.116** 2.14 -0.008 -0.23
WORKEAT 0.164*** 3.84 0.064** 2.31
WORKBATH -0.012 -0.32 -0.039 -1.40
HEAT1 0.293 1.44 0.053 0.40
HEAT2 0.350* 1.87 0.049 0.4232
(Table 4A concluded)
WATER -0.141 -1.43 -0.119* -1.79
BATH1 -0.005 -0.05 0.021 0.31
BATH2 -0.015 -0.16 -0.039 -0.64
BATH3 0.301* 1.82 0.029 0.33
CITY 0.123* 1.82 -- --
ROOMS -- -- 0.162*** 2.58
SHRKITCHEN 0.297* 1.75 -0.214* -1.75
OWNKITCHEN 0.406*** 3.78 0.054 0.72
COAL 0.331 1.44 -0.072 -0.64
BOTTLEDGAS 0.183 0.75 -0.202 -1.59
PIPEDGAS 0.222 0.90 -0.061 -0.45
KEROSENE -0.043 -0.04 -0.319 -0.84
MEDPRICE -0.761*** -9.67 0.181*** 5.21
FOODPRICE -0.128 -1.26 -0.225*** -2.89




* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.33
Table 4B
Estimated Spending Equation














FEMALE 2-5 0.066 0.51
FEMALE 6-10 -0.043 -0.38
FEMALE 11-18 -0.083 -0.82
FEMALE 19-24 -0.189* -1.90
FEMALE 25-60 0.013 0.11





































r2    6.168     21.632






   0.05
   0.23
   0.10
    0.59 
   0.02
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.35
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